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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

I BRIEF OF APPELLEE
]

vs.
Case No. 920341-CA

DON W. DUNBAR,
Defendant and Appellant.;

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal

from a conviction

for Driving During

Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§41-2-136, by a jury, in the First Circuit Court of Cache County,
State of Utah, Logan City Department, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson
presiding•

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

In addition to the twelve (12) issues raised in the Brief of
Appellant, each of which are addressed herein, Appellee THE STATE
OF UTAH claims that the evidence introduced in this case was
sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction. The standard of
review is as follows:

fl

...[T]he function of a reviewing court is
1

limited to insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence
regarding each element of the charge to enable a jury to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime.
..."

State v Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991), at 1150.

GOVERNING STATUTES AND RULES

Copies of the following statutes and Court Rules cited herein
are included in the Addendum to this Brief:
1.

Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2.

Utah Code Ann. §78-4-5.

3.

Utah Code Ann. §41-2-136.

4.

Utah Code Ann. §41-2-104.

5.

Utah Code Ann. §41-2-137.

6.

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3).

7.

Utah Code Ann. §41-2-122.

8.

Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-412.

9.

Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 3, 1991, the Defendant was personally served with
copies of a Criminal Summons and Information, charging him with the
crime of Driving During Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-2-136. The Summons and Information
were subsequently filed in the First Circuit Court of Cache County,

Logan City Department.

Copies of those pleadings are included in

the Addendum to this Brief.

The Defendant failed to appear in response to the Criminal
Summons, so a Bench Warrant was issued for his arrest. On January
31, 1992, after having been arrested on that and other unrelated
bench warrants, the Defendant was arraigned and the public defender
was appointed to represent him.

Defense counsel subsequently filed*a Motion to Dismiss, to
which the State responded, which was argued before the Court and
denied on April 3, 1992. (See Transcript of Motion Hearing, April
3, 1992, hereinafter referred to as "Tr.-3ff.)

Defense counsel also filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, to which the State also responded, and which was
argued before the Court and denied on April 24, 1992.

(See

Transcript of Motion Hearing, April 24, 1992, hereinafter referred
to as "Tr.-24".)

On May 8, 1992, the case was tried before a jury.

At the

conclusion of the case, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as
charged.

(See Transcript of Trial, May 8, 1992, hereinafter

referred to as "Tr.-8".)

Judgment of conviction was thereupon

entered by the Court. This appeal has been taken by the Defendant
from that Judgment.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 17, 1991, Officer James Meacham of the Cache County
Sheriff's Office, while stopped at the intersection of 300 South
Street and Main Street in Logan City, Cache County, State of Utah,
noticed the Defendant driving a motorcycle. (Tr.-3, pp. 7-8; Tr.-8,
pp.

51-56).

Officer Meacham

had personal

knowledge

Defendant's identity from previous dealings with him.

of the

(Tr.-8, pp.

50-51) .

At that time, Officer Meacham was off-duty, in his personal
vehicle, and without his customary law enforcement equipment.
(Tr.-3, p. 9; Tr.-8, p. 73). Because of his prior dealings with
the Defendant, Officer Meacham suspected that the Defendant's
driver's license was suspended as of that date.
Tr.-8, pp. 58-61).

(Tr.-3, pp. 4-5;

He thereupon checked on the status of the

Defendant's driver's license, and ordered a certified copy of the
Defendant's driving record from the Utah Driver's License Division.
(Record, hereinafter abbreviated as "R.", pp. 76-84).

After confirming with the Driver's License Division that the
Defendant's driver's license was, in fact, suspended on May 17,
1991, Officer Meacham requested that an Information be filed and a
Criminal

Summons

be issued

for the charge of Driving During

Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
4

$41-2-136.

(R., pp. 184-186).

Copies of the Information and

Criminal Summons are included in the Addendum to this Brief.

[The

procedural history of this case thereafter is set forth in the
Statement of the Case, above.]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict,

the evidence introduced in this case was sufficient to support the
Defendant's conviction.

State v. Warden, 813 P. 2d 1146 (Utah

1991) .

2.

Because any delay in this case was caused by Defendant's

failure to appear and voluntarily absenting himself

from the

jurisdiction, he was not denied a speedy trial. State v. Hoyt, 806
P. 2d 204 (Utah App. 1991).

3.

Because Defendant was personally served with copies of an

Information and Criminal Summons, and never appeared in response
thereto, he was not denied equal protection or due process.

Rule

6(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

4.

The trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction in

this case, because the crime was completed within Logan City, Cache
County, State of Utah.

Utah Code Ann. §78-4-5.

5

5.

The method by which the jury panel was initially seated

was irrelevant, because each party was afforded full opportunity to
exercise its challenges to individual jurors.

6.
instruct

The trial court took great care to explain to and
the

jury

on

the

presumption

of

innocence

and

the

Defendant's right not to testify.

7.

No evidence was introduced that the Defendant was driving

in River Heights, as previously directed-by the trial court.

8.

The

mere

subsequent

expiration

of

the

Defendant's

driver's license did not change its status from being previously
suspended.

9.
included

Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-412.

The charge of Driving Without a License was not a lesseroffense

of

the

original

charge

of

Driving

During

Suspension. Utah Code Ann. §§41-2-104, 41-2-137, and 76-1-402(3).
Therefore, the Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction to
that effect.

10.

The mere overhearing of defense counsel's name by a juror

during a recess was incidental and inconsequential. Logan City v.
Carlsen, 799 P. 2d 224 (Utah App. 1990).

6

11.

The Defendant was properly identified in this case, and

offered no evidence in rebuttal.

12.

The mere fact that the investigating officer also served

as bailiff in a previous motion hearing in this case did not
prejudice the Defendant in any way.

13.

The trial court properly permitted the State to amend the

date of the offense to conform to the evidence.

Rule 4(d), Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION.

In State v Warden, 813 P. 2d 1146 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth the standard of review of sufficiency of
the evidence, as follows:
The proper standard of review for appeals concerning the
sufficiency of evidence is well established. In making the
determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a
second fact finder. It is not the function of a reviewing
court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility
of witnesses. The mere existence of conflicting evidence,
therefore, does not warrant reversal. Rather, the function of
a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is
sufficient competent evidence regarding each element of the
charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant committed the crime.
Therefore, when
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
7

therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict• It is only when the evidence, viewed in this light,
is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction. ... 813 P.
2d at 1150.

In this case, the Defendant elected not to present any
evidence

in his defense.

(Tr.-8, p. 93).

Consequently, the

testimony of Officer Meacham, combined with the certified driving
record of the Defendant, Exhibit "1", constituted sufficient,
competent, and unrebutted evidence on each element of the charge
for the jury to convict the Defendant.

Viewed in the light most

favorable to the jury verdict, the State respectfully submits that
the evidence introduced in this case was sufficient to support the
jury verdict, and

that the Defendant's

conviction

should be

affirmed by this Court in all respects.

POINT II:

DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED A SPEEDY TRIAL.

In this case, the Defendant was served with a copy of the
Summons and Information by Deputy James Meacham on June 3, 1991.
(R., pp. 184-186; Tr.-3, p. 9). He failed to appear in response to
the Summons on either June 4, 1991, or June 11, 1991, being the
next two (2) Tuesdays following that service. (Tr.-3, pp. 10-11,
22-23; see Court calendars attached as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to
Reply to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial (R., pp. 128 138)).

Instead,

he

voluntarily

jurisdiction. (Tr.-3, pp. 24, 27).

8

absented

himself

from

the

Thereafter, a Bench Warrant was issued.

After the Defendant

was brought back before the Court on another, unrelated Bench
Warrant, he was then arraigned on this Information on January 31,
1992.

(R., pp. 172-174).

The matter then proceeded through pre-

trial motions, and trial was held on May 8, 1992. Notwithstanding
the jail sentence which he served in connection with another case,
the Defendant has never been incarcerated on the charge in this
case. (Tr.-3, pp. 12-13).

In Barker v Winqo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court established a balancing test in dealing with the
right to a speedy trial, considering four (4) factors:

(1) the

length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the Defendant's
assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the Defendant.

The

Utah appellate courts have adopted this balancing test on this
issue. See, State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 506 P.2d 67 (1973);
State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990); State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d
204 (Utah App. 1991).

In this case, in considering the length of and the reason for
any delay, it is readily apparent that all delays before the trial
were caused by the Defendant's own conduct.

If he had appeared,

pursuant to the Summons which was served upon him on June 3, 1991,
and requested a trial, the trial would have been scheduled shortly
thereafter.

Instead, the Defendant voluntarily absented himself

from the jurisdiction. It was not until he was arrested on various
9

other bench warrants that he was brought back before the Court to
be arraigned in this case.

Once the case was brought back onto the calendar, the Court
was obliged to deal with Defendant's pre-trial motions, prior to
the trial itself.

After various hearings, the trial was held on

May 8, 1992.

The Defendant first asserted the claim of denial of a speedy
trial, by way of his Motion to Dismiss filed on February 7, 1992.
(R., pp. 147-159).

[On February 4, 1992, the Court had initially

set the trial for February 21, 1992. (R., p 170). The next day,
defendant and his counsel filed a waiver of trial within 30 days,
pending the State's response to his discovery request. (R., pp.
168-169).]

However, because the entire time period between the

date the Defendant was served with the Information and Summons
(June 3, 1991) and the date of his arraignment (January 31, 1992)
was caused by the Defendant voluntarily absenting himself from the
jurisdiction, no prejudice accrued to the Defendant. Furthermore,
the time period between the date of arraignment and the date of
trial was occupied by responding to and hearing the Defendant's
pre-trial motions.

Therefore, as this Court noted in State v.

Hoyt, cited above, "... When a defendant's actions cause delay in
the trial date, the right to a speedy trial is temporarily waived
by those actions. ...' [T]he right to a speedy trial is meant to be

10

a shield against oppression, and not a sword to be used to
decapitate the process of justice. '...ff

806 P. 2d at 208.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly
ruled that Defendant was not denied a speedy trial in this case,
and denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss accordingly.

This Court

should affirm that ruling.
POINT III:

DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE
PROCESS.

Defendant claims that the officer's failure to either issue to
him a citation, or to arrest him on the spot, somehow constitutes
a violation of equal protection and due process.

Officer Meacham

explained that he did not arrest or cite the Defendant on the day
he saw him driving, because he was not in uniform and did not have
his customary law enforcement equipment with him. (Tr.-3, p. 9;
Tr.-8, p. 73).

Consequently, after verifying the fact that the

Defendant's driver's license was suspended as of the date of the
incident, and obtaining a certified copy of his driving record, an
Information and Summons were issued in this case.

Defendant's argument ignores the fact that, pursuant to Rule
6(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a summons may be issued in
lieu of a warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the
accused. That procedure is expressly authorized and sanctioned by
applicable law, and was followed in this case.
original

documents

were

ultimately
11

The date when the

filed with

the

Court

is

irrelevant to Defendant's claim, because he was personally served
with a copy of the Information and Summons on June 3, 1991, and
then never appeared in response thereto until he was arrested in
January, 1992. Therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain that
he was not cited or arrested on the date of this incident.
Defendant's argument is without merit.

POINT IV:

THE TRIAL COURT HAD PROPER JURISDICTION.

In May and June, 1991, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45, the First Circuit Court had jurisdiction over all classes of
misdemeanors occurring within Logan City, because there was neither
a municipal justice court nor a county justice court in existence
at that time. [The Logan City Municipal Justice Court was created,
effective January 1, 1992.]

The testimony of Officer Meacham was clear and undisputed that
he saw the Defendant driving a motorcycle within the city limits of
Logan, Utah. (Tr.-3, pp. 7-8; Tr.-8, pp. 52-57).

At that point,

the elements of "driving on a highway within Cache County" of the
charge of Driving on Suspension were complete;

and all that

remained was to prove that the Defendant's driver's license was
suspended as of that date, which was accomplished by way of the
certified copy of Defendant's driving record, Exhibit "1". The
fact that the Defendant then proceeded and was followed by the
officer into a neighboring community, where a municipal justice
court is located, is irrelevant.
12

The offense was complete at the

intersection in Logan, Utah, where the Defendant was first seen
driving by the officer.
jurisdiction

in

this

The Circuit Court properly exercised its
case,

and

ruled

correctly

in

denying

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction in this
case.

This Court should affirm that ruling.

POINT V:

THE METHOD OF SEATING THE JURY PANEL WAS IRRELEVANT.

The method in which the jury panel was initially called in
this case is irrelevant.

No matter how they were seated to begin

with, each party was afforded
challenge

individual

jurors

full and

fair opportunity to

for cause, and

to

exercise

the

requisite number of peremptory challenges. (Tr.-8, pp. 2-37; R., p.
36).

The Defendant has failed to cite any authority or otherwise to
demonstrate any legitimate reason why the method of preliminarily
seating the jury in this case could possibly have rendered the jury
which was selected to try the case either unfair or partial.
Therefore, because any error in seating the jury was harmless in
this case, the Defendant's argument is without merit, and should be
disregarded.

POINT VI: THE JURY WAS PROPERLY IMPANELED.
Defendant's claim that the jurors were not willing to give him
the presumption of innocence has no basis in fact.
indicates

that

the

presumption
13

of

innocence

was

The record
explained

thoroughly by the Court during voir dire.

(Tr.-8, pp. 27-35). The

Court specifically explained the Defendant's right not to testify.
(Tr.-8. pp. 32-33).

Finally, the Court further pursued Defense

counsel's claim that only one juror could be fair, by asking, "If
you could not be fair, if you cannot be fair and wouldn't want
somebody with your frame of mind sitting on the case, raise your
hand." (Tr.-8, p. 34). The record is silent thereafter, indicating
that no hand was raised.

Furthermore, the Court instructed the jury on the presumption
of innocence and the Defendant's right not to testify. (R., pp. 38,
41, 50, 51).

Therefore, Defense counsel's argument is taken out of context.
The record clearly reflects that the Court took great care to
insure that a fair and impartial jury was seated and correctly
instructed.

There is no basis for claiming otherwise.

POINT VII: THE MENTION OF DRIVING IN RIVER HEIGHTS WAS IRRELEVANT.
The only time during the trial when the City of River Heights
was mentioned was during Mr. Preston's opening statement. (Tr.-8,
pp.

47-48).

Defense counsel immediately

objected, the Court

instructed the jury to disregard the statement, and Mr. Preston
then explained that the State's position was that the Defendant was
driving a motor vehicle iji Logan City while his driver's license
was suspended.

Mr. Preston's opening statement was not evidence.
14

When Officer Meacham was called to testify, he merely stated
that he followed the Defendant "approximately a mile-and-a-half to
two miles, total." (Tr.-8, p. 56). The City of River Heights was
never mentioned.

As set forth in Point IV, above, Mr. Preston scrupulously
avoided any reference to the Defendant driving in the City of River
Heights during the presentation of evidence, consistent with the
ruling of the trial court on April 24, 1992. (Tr.-24, pp. 5-11).
Because the Defendant did not testify, *no rebuttal evidence on
driving in River Heights was necessary. All evidence introduced by
the State established that the crime was completed in Logan City,
Cache County, State of Utah.

Defendant has demonstrated no

legitimate basis for a mistrial on this issue.

POINT VIII:
IRRELEVANT.

THE EXPIRATION OF DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS

At the trial of this case, the State introduced into evidence
as Exhibit "1" a certified copy of the Defendant's driving record.
(R., pp. 76-84).

That record shows that the Defendant's Utah

driver's license was last suspended on July 24, 1989, which status
remained effective on the date of this incident.

The fact that

Defendant's driver's license may have subsequently expired is
irrelevant.

Defense counsel cites no authority for the proposition that,
once a driver's license expires, it is no longer suspended.
15

It is

obvious that a driver's license which has merely expired may be
readily renewed, while a driver's license which has been suspended
may not be reinstated without compliance with the terms and
conditions provided by law. (R., pp. 78-79; see Utah Code Ann. §4112a-412).

Defendant's argument is without merit, and the trial

court properly denied Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict on
that issue.

POINT IX: DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON A LESSERINCLUDED OFFENSE.
The Defendant was not entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction

on the charge

of Driving Without

a License, in

violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-2-104, in this case.

First,

contrary to defense counsel's representations to the trial court,
and his proposed jury instruction and verdict forms (R., pp. 5860), that charge is not a lesser included offense of the underlying
charge of Driving During Suspension.
represented

by

defense

counsel;

It is not an infraction, as
instead,

it

is

a

Class

C

Misdemeanor, as is the original charge, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§41-2-137.

[Utah Code Ann. §41-6-12, cited by defense counsel,

only applies to violations of Chapter J5 of Title 41. Violations of
Chapter

2, of

Title

41

are

governed

by

§41-2-137, above.]

Therefore, by definition/ because it was the same degree of offense
as the original chargef it was not a "lesser" included offense.

Second, it was not an "included" offense, as defined by Utah
Code Ann. §76-1-402(3).

As set forth in Point VIII, above, a
16

person's driver's license may still be suspended, subject to
reinstatement, even after it has expired, and defense counsel has
cited no authority to the contrary.

As this Court observed in

State v Kinsey, 797 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1990), in comparing
the statutory elements of each crime, it is evident that §41-2-104
merely prohibits operating a motor vehicle unless the person is a
licensed driver, while §41-2-136 adds the additional element that
the person's driver's license has first been denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked, and the person then operates a motor
vehicle while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked.

Expiration of the license is not tantamount to a status

of being denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked, since it does
not require the same procedure for reinstatement.

Finally, Defendant provided no rational basis for the
jury to acquit him of the original charge, since he put on no
evidence in his defense.

In State v Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah

1983) at 531, the Supreme Court held that "the evidence must
provide a rational basis for both acquitting of the charged offense
and convicting of the lesser included offense."
original.)
trial

court

(Emphasis in

Defendant provided no such basis in this case.
properly

refused

to

give

Defendant's

The

proposed

instruction on what was, in fact, not a lesser included offense.

POINT X: THERE WAS NO IMPROPER CONTACT WITH A JUROR IN THIS CASE.
In this case, during a recess of the trial, one of the jurors
17

apparently overheard the name of Mr. Perry being mentioned in a
conversation which took place in the foyer between Mr. Preston and
Officer Meacham.

The Court immediately examined that juror on the

record (Tr.-8, pp. 81-85), and determined that no improper contact
occurred.

In Logan City v Carlsen, 799 P. 2d 224 (Utah App. 1990) at
226,

this

Court

observed

that

incidental

or

inconsequential

contacts will not give rise to this rule (raising a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice) .

By the stage of the trial when the

conversation occurred, the jury had long since been questioned and
sworn, and the State had concluded its case-in-chief. The juror in
question had been present throughout the proceedings, and had
obviously seen and heard Mr. Perry in the Courtroom.

The mere

overhearing of his name during a subsequent recess constitutes the
most

insignificant,

incidental,

and

inconsequential

contact

imaginable.

Following

his

questioning

of

the

juror,

the

Court

was

satisfied that no prejudice had occurred. Defense counsel's afterthe-fact Affidavit of Possible Juror Bias (R., pp. 8-9) is of no
avail, since there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that
that juror either demonstrated any actual bias or prejudice during
the trial, or overheard any improper comments by counsel or the
officer during the recess.

No improper contact occurred in this

case.
18

POINT XI: DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY IDENTIFIED IN THIS CASE.
Contrary to defense counsel's representation that the portion
of the trial transcript quoted in the Appendix to Appellant's Brief
constitutes the only evidence from which the jury could find the
Defendant to be the same person identified in the certified driving
record, Officer Meacham clearly identified the Defendant as the
person he saw driving on the date in question. (Tr.-8, pp. 50-57).
The Officer had personally obtained the certified copy of the
Defendant's driving record, Exhibit "1".

The Defendant offered no

evidence in rebuttal to the certified driving record, either to
claim that he was not the same person, or that he had not received
notice of the suspension.

Finally, the identical name and date of

birth appear on both the Information and on Exhibit "1", and the.
jury had access to both records to determine the Defendant's
identity. (R., pp. 76-84, 186).

Utah Code Ann. §41-2-122 provides that notice given by mail is
complete upon the expiration of four (4) days after the deposit of
the notice in the mail, addressed to the address shown by the
records of the Driver's License Division. There being no evidence
to the contrary in the record, Defendant's argument is without
merit.

POINT XII: THE STATUS OF THE OFFICER AS A BAILIFF WAS IRRELEVANT.
Once again, defense counsel cites no authority whatsoever for
his claim that the officer should not have both acted as bailiff
19

and testified as a witness at the Motion hearing on April 3, 1992.
Moreover, defense counsel expressly waived any objection thereto.
(Tr.-3, pp. 3-4). The Defendant was not incarcerated, so there was
no issue with courtroom security. A different bailiff was provided
at the trial.

In short, there was no possible prejudice which

could have resulted to the Defendant. Defendant's claim is without
merit.

POINT XIII:

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO CHANGING THE DATE ON THE
INFORMATION WAS WITHOUT MERIT.

Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, clearly provides
that an information may be amended at any time before verdict, so
long as the substantial rights of the Defendant are not prejudiced.
Defendant made no request for a bill of particulars or other
inquiry regarding this incident.

Therefore, he cannot now claim

prejudice from evidence which established the date of the offense.
State v Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S.
1044 (1988).
This issue was given a full and fair hearing at the time of
the hearing on April 3, 1992.

The trial court correctly granted

the motion to amend, and this Court should affirm that ruling.

20

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
submits

that

the

Defendant

has

neither

marshaled

sufficient

evidence nor demonstrated sufficient error which would warrant a
reversal

of

any

of

the

rulings

of

the trial

court,

or an

overturning of the jury verdict of guilty and the judgment of
conviction entered

in this case.

On the contrary, there is

substantial, competent, and unrebutted evidence to support every
element

of

the

charge

in this

case.

Therefore,

the State

respectfully requests that this Court sustain the jury verdict and
affirm the judgment and rulings of the trial court in all respects.
DATED this 28th day of August, 1992.

PATRICK B. NOLAN
Deputy Cache County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 28th day of August, 1992, I
delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Ted
S. Perry, Attorney for Defendant and Appellant, at 29 West 100
North, Logan, Utah

84321.

PATRICK B. NOLAN
Deputy Cache County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF

LTAH Hl'LEh Or CRIMINAL rROCEDrRF
magistrate having jurisdiction to investigate
charge and determine if there was probable
cause to believe that offense had been committed and that defendant was guiltv thereof
State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71* P.2d 196
(1937).

magistr.'.e, (4) subscribing and swearing to the
information bv the complaining witness, and
(5) filing of the information with the magistrate or clerk of the court. State ex rel Cannon
v. Leary, 646 P 2d 727 (Utah 1982).
—Signature.
Deputy district attorney being authorized by
law to subscribe and file information, his signing as district attorney, while constituting an
irregularity, did not invalidate information.
State v. Merntt. 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497
(1926).
Although prosecutor's authorization and signature affixed on the reverse side of an information violated Rule 10(d), U.R.C.P., requiring
limiting impressions to one side of the paper
only, such violation did not deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Cannon v.
Leary, 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).
Filing of information was held to toll the
statute of limitations even though prosecuting
attorney forgot to sign it, since the error did
not prejudice the defendant, and was one that
could be corrected. State v. Strand, 674 P.2d
109 (Utah 1983).

Prosecution by complaint.
Filing of complaint in district court by district attorney charging defendant with injuring cow by altering and defacing brand was
improper, as statute provided that all criminal
matters in district court could only be prosecuted by information or indictment. State v.
Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941).
Prosecution by information.
—Constitutionality.
Prosecution by information for noncapital
felony, committed after statehood, was not in
violation of federal Constitution. Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597
(1900).
—Presentment and filing.
Once the information is authorized by the
prosecuting attorney, its presentment and filing are not acts which the prosecuting attorney
must personally perform. State ex rel. Cannon
v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).
—Procedure.
The steps required to properly initiate prosecution of a felony by information are: (1)
screening of the case by the prosecutor; (2) authorization of the prosecution, evidenced by the
signature of the prosecutor affixed to the information; (3) presentment of the information to a

Rule 6

When jurisdiction of district court attaches.
The accused was brought under the power of
the district court by the filing of the information; the function of the record from the committing magistrate was to evidence the regularity or irregularity of the proceedings leading up to attachment of jurisdiction. State v.
Trujillo, 117 Utah 237, 214 P.2d 626 (1950).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments
and Informations §§ 2, 4, 25 to 28.
C.J.S. — 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations §§ 1, 3, 66.
A.L.R. — Power of private citizen to institute criminal proceedings without authoriza-

tion or approval by prosecuting attorney, 66
A,L.R.3d 732.
Limitations on state prosecuting attorney's
discretion to initiate prosecution by indictment
or by information, 44 A.L.R.4th 401.
Key Numbers. — Indictment and Information «=» 1, 3, 5, 36, 39.

Rule 6. Warrant of arrest or summons.
(a) Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall cause to issue
either a warrant for the arrest or a summons for the appearance of the accused.
Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the information, or
from any affidavit filed with the information, that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has committed it, the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a
summons for the appearance of the accused.
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the accused will appear on a summons and there is no substantial danger of a breach of the peace, or injury to
343
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persons or property, or danger to the community, a summons may issue in lieu
of a warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the accused. If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue. A warrant of arrest may issue m
cases where the defendant has failed to appear in response to a summons or
citation or thereafter when required by the court. When a warrant of arrest is
issued, the amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate and stated on the
warrant.
(c) (1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace officer. The summons may
be served by a peace officer or any person authorized to serve a summons
in a civil action.
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at any
place within the state.
(3) The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. The
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the
arrest, but upon request shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon
as practicable. If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at
the time of the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the offense
charged and of the fact that the warrant has been issued. The summons
shall be served as in civil actions, or by mailing it to the defendant's last
known address.
(4) The person executing a warrant or serving a summons shall make
return thereof to the magistrate as soon as practicable. At the request of
the prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to
the magistrate for cancellation.
Cross-References. — Arrest generally,
§ 77-7-1 et seq.
Bail, § 77-20-1 et seq.
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to appear at arraignment, Rule 10.
Bench warrant, failure of one on bail to appear for judgment, Rule 22.
Citation for misdemeanor, §§ 77-7-18 to
77-7-20.
Extradition, governor's warrant, § 77-30-7.

Fees of constable serving warrant or summons, § 21-3-3.5.
"Magistrate" defined, § 77-1-3.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceedings for issuance of warrant for arrest or for
issuance of criminal summons, Rule 1101,
U.R.E.
Youth Parole Authority, revocation of parole, order to retake violator, § 62A-7-112

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Issuance of warrant.

ANALYSIS

Affidavits.
Issuance of warrant.
—Discretion of magistrate.
Affidavits.
Affidavits for arrest need not show a prima
facie case; affidavits need only set forth facts
tending to establish the commission of the offense and the guilt of the defendant. United
States v Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P 673
(1887), appeal dismissed, 145 US. 636y 12 S.
Ct. 980, 36 L Ed 857 (1892)

—Discretion of magistrate.
A magistrate is not justified in refusing to
issue a warrant unless the charge is too indefinitely stated to warrant the belief that an offense has been committed, or that defendant is
the guilty party. United States v Eldredge, 5
Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (1887), appeal dismissed,
145 U S 636, 12 S Ct. 980, 36 L Ed 857
(1892).
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Section

Section
78-4-12

Records to be maintained —
Number of reporters determined by Judicial Council
Appointment and terms of circuit
78-4-13.
judges
78-4-15, 78-4-16. Repealed,
78-4-17 to 78-4-18 Repealed.
Jury trials — Fees and mileage —
78-4-19.
Jurors and witnesses — Certificates and costs.
State responsibility for expenses
78-4-20.
of system — Counties' duties —
Service of county clerk — Reimbursement [Effective until January 1, 1992].
Circuit court costs [Effective January 1, 1992].
Use of city court facilities — Em78-4-21.
ployees — Supplies — Equipment [Repealed effective January 1, 1992].
78-4-22.
Allocation of fines, fees, court

cost**, and foifeitures imposed
[Effective until January 1
19921
Allocation of fines, fees, costs and
forfeitures imposed [Effective
January 1, 1992].
78-4-23.
Remission of monies collected [Effective January 1, 1992].
78-4-24.
Fees for filing and other services
or actions [Effective until January 1, 1992].
Fees for filing and other services
or actions [Effective January 1,
1992].
78-4-25.
Repealed.
78-4-26.
Governing bodies may provide
support functions through other
offices like provided for district
courts [Repealed effective January 1, 1992].
78-4-29 to 78-4-32. Repealed.

78-4-3. Definitions [Repealed effective January 1, 1992].
As used in this act:
(1) "Primary circuit court location" means a city or cities in each circuit where the circuit judge or judges maintain regular court hours in a
permanent court facility from which secondary locations in the circuit are
served under this act. The city may or may not be a county seat, and there
may be more than one primary location in a circuit.
(2) "Secondary circuit court location" means those county seats where
services are provided by the county, pursuant to contract with the administrative office of the courts.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-3, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 28.
Repealed effective January 1, 1992. —
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals § 78-4-3, as
last amended by L. 1988, ch. 248, § 28, relating to circuit courts definitions, effective January 1, 1992.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,1988, rewrote Subsection (2) following "county" which had read
"seat cities or other municipalities m the circuit served by the circuit judge or judges from
the primary circuit location or locations"; deleted former Subsections (3) to (7) which had

contained definitions of "Clerk of the circuit
court," "Circuit court clerk's office," "Record on
appeal," "Transcribed record on appeal," and
"Substitute judge"; and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsection (1).
Meaning of "this act" — The term "this
act," in the preliminary language and in Subsection (1), means Laws 1977, Chapter 77,
which enacted various sections throughout Titles 10, 11, 17, 20, 21, 31 (now repealed), 39,
49, 51, 53 (now repealed), 76, and 78. See the
Tables of Session Laws in the Parallel Tables
volume.

78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concurrent [Effective until January 1, 1992].
(1) (a) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors and
infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and may impose
the punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of the circuit
court has the authority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including the
79
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conducting of proceedings for the preliminary examination to determine
probable cause, commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of persons charged with criminal offenses.
(b) When a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under
Section 77-3-1 or an arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate
under Section 77-7-18, the complaint may be commenced or the arrested
person may be taken before any circuit court judge in the county or the
justice court judge in the county in whose precinct the offense occurred,
unless both are unavailable; then before any justice court judge having
jurisdiction.
(c) All complaints for offenses charged under Title 41 except offenses
charged under Article 5, Chapter 6, Title 41, shall be filed in the municipal justice court or the county justice court where the offense occurred if
those justice courts exist and have jurisdiction of the offenses.
(2) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising
under or by reason of the violation of any county ordinance involving persons
18 years of age or older, but if a county justice court exists in the county,
jurisdiction is concurrent.
(3) (a) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising under or by reason of the violation of any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years of age and older in those municipalities in which a
municipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created.
(b) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with county justice
courts over violations of municipal ordinances charging persons 18 years
of age and older with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, or reckless driving
in municipalities within a county precinct in which a municipal justice
court does not exist.
(c) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice
courts over violations of state statutes in municipalities where a municipal justice court exists.
(4) The circuit court has jurisdiction over traffic offenses committed by
persons older than 16 and younger than 18 years of age except those offenses
exclusive to the juvenile court under Subsection (l)(c), Subsection
78-3a-16(l)(a), and Section 78-5-105. The circuit court shall notify the juvenile
court of a conviction of any person younger than 18 years of age of an offense
under Section 78-3a-39.5.
(5) The circuit court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for
suspension under Section 41-2-128.
(6) Circuit court judges may transfer cases within the court's jurisdiction
under Subsection (4) to the juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings according to rules of the Judicial Council.

Circuit court jurisdiction — Jurisdiction in
circuit court when no justice court — Jurisdiction retained until effective date [Effective January 1, 1992].
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over class A misdemeanors. Circuit courts
have jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors classified by Article 5, Chapter 6,
80

Title 41, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, ordinances that
comply with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, and class B misdemeanors
classified by any title other than Title 41. Circuit courts have jurisdiction over
all related misdemeanors arising out of a single criminal episode. When a
justice court is given jurisdiction of a criminal matter and there is no justice
court with territorial jurisdiction, the circuit court shall have jurisdiction. The
circuit court shall retain jurisdiction over cases properly filed in the circuit
court prior to January 1, 1992. The circuit court shall have jurisdiction as
provided in Section 10-3-923.
History: C. 1953, 78-4-5, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 29; 1989,
ch. 150, § 5; 1989, ch. 157, § 9; 1989, ch. 188,
§ 8; 1990, ch. 55, § 2; 1991, ch. 268, § 30.
Amended effective January 1, 1992. —
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 30 amends this section
effective January 1,1992. See amendment note
below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, divided Subsection (1) into subsections; substituted "Section
77-3-1" and "Section 77-7-18" for "Section
77-57-2" and "Section 77-13-17," respectively,
in the first sentence of Subsection (l)(b); and
made minor stylistic changes throughout.
The 1989 amendment by ch. 150, effective
April 24, 1989, rewrote Subsection (4) which
read "The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court over all traffic offenses committed by persons younger than 18
years of age"; added Subsection (5); and made a
minor stylistic change in Subsection (2).
The 1989 amendment by ch. 157, effective
July 1,1989, designated the former second sentence of Subsection (l)(b) as Subsection (l)(c);
substituted justice court judge" for "justice of
the peace" in two places in present Subsection
(l)(b); substituted "municipal justice court or
the county justice court" for "court of the municipal justice of the peace of the precinct of the
county justice of the peace" in Subsection (l)(c);
substituted "a county justice court" for "the office of precinct justice of the peace" in Subsection (2); designated former Subsection (3) as

present Subsection (3)(a); added Subsections
(3)(b) and (3)(c); and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1989 amendment by ch. 188, effective
July 1,1989, designated the former second sentence of Subsection (1Kb) as (l)(c); added the
second sentence of Subsection (4); and made
minor stylistic changes.
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, rewrote the first sentence in Subsection
(4), which read "The circuit court has jurisdiction over all traffic offenses committed by persons younger than 18 years of age, except those
offenses exclusive to the juvenile court under
Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a)," and added Subsection (6).
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,
1992, deleted the (l)(a) designation, rewrote
the first sentence, which read "Circuit courts
have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors and infractions involving persons 18
years of age and older and may impose the
punishments prescribed for these offenses," deleted the former second sentence, which read
"The judge of the circuit court has the authority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including
the conducting of proceedings for the preliminary examination to determine probable cause,
commitment prior to trial, or the release on
bail of persons charged with criminal offenses,"
added the remaining language, and deleted
former Subsections (l)(b), (l)(c), and (2)
through (6).

78-4-6. Municipal department of circuit court — Report to
court administrator [Repealed effective January
1, 1992].
(1) (a) The governing body of any municipality may by ordinance establish
a municipal department of the circuit court. A circuit court in this capacity is the "municipal department of the (naming the circuit) circuit court
for (naming the municipality), Utah."
(b) A circuit court established under Subsection (l)(a), for which funding is not available at time of establishment, may not be implemented
until funding is provided for the court.
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Subsection (1) when a person fails or refuses to surrender any of those documents to the division upon demand.
(3) The division shall assess against a person making an application referred to in Subsection 41-2-112(14), in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 41-2-112(14), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to , over the costs required
to serve orders related to the purposes of Subsection (2).
History: C. 1953, 41-2-23.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 191, § 1; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 137, § 34; 1988, ch. 98, § 1; 1989, ch. 209,
§ 19; 1990, ch. 30, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-

ment, effective July 1,1989, inserted "disqualification" in Subsection (l)(a)(i).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" for
"41-2-112(6)" in two places in Subsection (3).

41-2-136, Operating vehicle prohibited while license denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — Penalties.
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which his license
was issued and who operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of this
state while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be
punished as provided in this section.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a violation
specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a vehicle while his license is
suspended, disqualified, or revoked for:
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10;
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44;
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43;
(iv) a violation of Section 76-5-207;
(v) a criminal action that the person plead guilty to as a result of a
plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one
or more of the sections or ordinances under this subsection;
(vi) a revocation or suspension which has been extended under
Subsection 41-2-127(2); or
(vii) where disqualification is the result of driving a commercial
motor vehicle while the person's CDL is disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked under Subsection 41-2-715(1).
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based upon his operating a vehicle while his license is
suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licensure for violations
corresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (a).
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at least the maximum
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section 76-3-301.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 29; C. 1943,
57-4-32; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 8; 1983, ch. 183,
§ 27; C. 1953, 41-2-28; renumbered by L.
1987, ch. 137, § 36; 1989, ch. 209, § 20; 1989,

ch. 252, § 7; 1990, ch. 30, § 8; 1991, ch. 241,
§ 60; 1992, ch. 80, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment by ch. 252, effective April 24, 1989, in-
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serted "denied" m two places in Subsection (1)
and substituted "Subsection" for "Section" in
Subsection (3)(a)(vi).
The 1989 amendment by ch. 209, effective
July 1, 1989, inserted "disqualified" twice in
Subsection (1) and once m Subsection (3)(a),
an
£ m a d ^ stylistic changes.
, J n 6 199? ^ e n ^ e n t \ e ^ V e «pnl«2?'
1990, inserted violation of a before loca in
Subsection (3)(a)(m); substituted action for
"prohibition" and inserted "to" after "guilty" in
Subsection (3)(a)(v); substituted "a revocation
or suspension which" for "whose revocation or
suspension" at the beginning of Subsection
(3)(a)(vi); and added Subsection (3)(a)(vu).

The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, substituted "class C" for "class B" in Subsections (2) and (3)(b) and substituted "class B"
for "class A" in Subsection (3)(a).
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1 9 9 2 ) substituted "or under the laws of the
state in whlch hls hcense w a s lssued a n dw h o

operates" for "and operates" in Subsection (1),
s u b s t l t u t e d « t h a t „ for « w m c h „ m Subsection
,„VoVi,
, , , ^nonn4r o„u e o ,.^„ /QVM ^
f W ( m ) , added present Subsect on (3)(b), redesignated former Subsection (3)(b) as present
Subsection (3)(c), and substituted at least for
m an
amount not less than m Subsection
<3)(c).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in United States v. Peck, 762 F. Supp.
315 (D Utah 1991).

41-2-137. Violation of chapter — Misdemeanor.
A violation of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise specified.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 30; C. 1943,
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend57-4-33; L. 1967, ch. 83, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 9; ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
1986, ch. 178, § 25; C. 1953, 41-2-29; renum- "class C" for "class B."
bered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 37; 1991, ch. 241,
§ 61.

PART 2
LICENSES — IMPAIRED PERSONS
41-2-202. Driver License Medical Advisory Board — Membership — Guidelines for licensing impaired persons — Recommendations to division.
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-241 provides
that the Driver License Medical Advisory
Board is repealed July 1, 1997.
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History: C. 1953, 41-2-103, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 137, § 3; 1989, ch. 209, § 2; 1989,
ch. 252, § 2; 1990, ch. 30, § 2; 1991, ch. 190,
§ 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment by ch. 252, effective April 24, 1989, inserted "or if denied under Section 41-2-114" in
Subsection (4)(a) and added "and" at the end of
Subsection (13).
The 1989 amendment by ch. 209, effective
July 1, 1989, so rewrote the section as to make
a detailed analysis impracticable.
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, rewrote the section to such an extent
that a detailed analysis is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment, effective October 1,
1991, substituted "Section 41-2-112 is $15" for
"Subsection 41-2-112(1) is $10"in Subsections
(1) and (2); substituted "Section 41-2-112 is
$20" for "Subsection 41-2-112(1) is $15" in Subsections (3) and (4); substituted "Section
41-2-112" for "Subsection 41-2-112(1)" in Subsection (5); substituted "Section 41-2-125 is
$15" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5) is $10" in Sub-

sections (6) to (9); substituted "Section
41-2-125" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5)" in Subsection (10); substituted "Section 41-2-125 is
$5" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5) is $3" in Subsection (11); substituted "Section 41-2-125 is
$12" for "Subsection 41-2-125(5) is $10" in Subsections (12) and (13); substituted "Section
41-2-125 is $12" for "Subsection 41-2-125(3)(a)
is $10" in Subsections (14) and (15); substituted "Section 41-2-125" for "Section 41-2125(5)" in Subsections (16) and (17); substituted "Section 41-2-112" for "Subsection 41-2112(7)" in Subsections (22) and (23); substituted "$10" for "$5" in Subsection (24); substituted "Section 41-2-112" for "Subsection 41-2112(14)" in Subsections (25)(a) and (25)(b); substituted "Section 41-2-130" for "Subsection 412-130(8)(a)" and "Section 41-6-44.10" for "Subsection 41-6-44.10(2)(e)" in Subsection (26);
substituted "Section 41-2-134" for "Subsection
41-2-134(3)" in Subsection (28); added present
Subsection (29) and (30); redesignated former
Subsection (29) as present Subsection (31); and
made a stylistic change.

41-2-104. Operators must be licensed — Taxicab endorsement.
(1) No person, except one expressly exempted under Section 41-2-107,
41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 41-2-121(4), or Title 41, Chapter 22, may
operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is licensed as an operator by the division under this chapter.
(2) No person, except those exempted under Section 41-2-107, may operate
or, while within the passenger compartment of a vehicle, exercise any degree
or form of physical control of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle upon a
highway unless the person holds a valid license issued under this chapter for
the type or class of vehicle being towed.
(3) (a) A person may not operate a motor vehicle as a taxicab on a highway
of this state unless the person has a taxicab endorsement issued by the
division on his driver license.
(b) This subsection applies to all Utah licenses originally issued, renewed, or extended on or after July 1, 1989.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 2; C. 1943,
57-4-4; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 5;
1985, ch. 21, § 18; 1987, ch. 162, § 24; C.
1953, § 41-2-2; renumbered by L. 1987, ch.
137, § 4; 1987, ch. 162, § 24; 1989, ch. 209,
§ 3.

Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, added Subsection
(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1988).
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serted "denied" m two places in Subsection (1)
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
and substituted "Subsection" for "Section" in 1991, substituted "class C" for "class B" in SubSubsection (3)(a)(vi).
sections (2) and (3)(b) and substituted "class B"
The 1989 amendment by ch. 209, effective for "class A" in Subsection (3)(a).
July 1, 1989, inserted "disqualified" twice in
T h e 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
Subsection (1) and once in Subsection (3)(a), 1 9 9 2 ) substituted "or under the laws of the
an
m a
£
^ stylistic changes.
state in which his license was issued and who
1 J n 6 1 9 9 ? ™ e n * * e n t ' f^*ive
^P"*2?'
operates" for "and operates" in Subsection (1),
1990, inserted violation of a before loca in s u b s t i t u t e d « t h a t » f o r « w h i c h » i n S u b s e C t l on
Subsection (3)(aXm); substituted action for , o w V...N , , ,
.0 , ,
,oy,,
"prohibition" and inserted "to" after "guilty" in (3)(a)(m) added present Subsection (3)(b), reSubsection (3)(a)(v); substituted "a revocation designated former Subsection (3)(b) as present
or suspension which" for "whose revocation or Subsection (3)(c), and substituted at least for
in a n
suspension" at the beginning of Subsection
amount not less than in Subsection
(3)(a)(vi); and added Subsection (3)(a)(vii).
W^NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in United States v. Peck, 762 F. Supp.
315 (D. Utah 1991).

41-2-137. Violation of chapter — Misdemeanor.
A violation of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise specified.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 30; C. 1943,
57-4-33; L. 1967, ch. 83, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 9;
1986, ch. 178, § 25; C. 1953, 41-2-29; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 37; 1991, ch. 241,
§ 61.

Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"class C" for "class B."

PART 2
LICENSES — IMPAIRED PERSONS
41-2-202. Driver License Medical Advisory Board — Membership — Guidelines for licensing impaired persons — Recommendations to division.
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-241 provides
that the Driver License Medical Advisory
Board is repealed July 1, 1997.
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76-1-402

CRIMINAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v.
Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977).
Defendant's actions did not constitute a "single criminal episode" since he committed two
separate burglaries by breaking into two separate buildings within an apartment complex,
even though the burglaries were only 20
minutes apart. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1985).

ANALYSIS

Conduct constituting single crime.
Conduct constituting separate crimes.
—Property pawned separately.
Traffic offenses.
Cited.
Conduct constituting single crime.
Retention of stolen property of different individuals is a single act and a single offense if
evidence shows that the items were retained
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for
related offenses, a second prosecution was precluded. State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah
1983).

—Property pawned separately.
Where property was stolen and defendant received and pawned it on three separate days
spread over a period of 18 days, the offenses did
not arise out of a single cnminal episode. State
v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 'Utah 1986).
Traffic offenses.
This section does not prevent the prosecution
of a drunk driving charge under § 41-6-44 after the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving
without a license, without a registration certificate and without a safety sticker, since the
citations charge separate offenses entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606
P.2d 253 (Utah 1980).

Conduct constituting separate crimes.
Where defendant committed a robbery in one
county, and later, in another county some 65
miles away, picked up two hitchhikers and decided to kidnap them as hostages, the difference in time, location, and the criminal objectives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the
conduct separate crimes rather than one single
criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d
1206 (Utah 1977).
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the
failure to stop at the command of a police officer were two separate offenses, and not a single
episode, because the two offenses occurred a
day apart and the criminal objective in the unlawful taking was to obtain possession while

Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896
(Utah 1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749
P.2d 631 (Utah 1988); State v. Fletcher, 751
P.2d 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega,
751 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson,
115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1989),

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
Law § 20.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 29.

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
12
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<3) A defendant may he convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; L. 1974, ch. 32, § 2.
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating another statute, § 76-6-704.

Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense,
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const.,
Amend. V; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Act."
Judgment entered for included offense after reversal of conviction.
Jurisdiction of a single court.
Lesser included offense.
—Aggravated assault.
—Aggravated robbery.
—Attempted homicide.
—Forcible sexual abuse.
—Instructions.
—Joy riding.
—Manslaughter.
—Negligent homicide.
—Theft.
Misdemeanor and felony charges.
Separate offenses.
—Automobile violations.
—Burglary and larceny.
—Remoteness in time.
—Sex offetYS&s.
Cited.

defendant. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct.
App. 1989).
Judgment entered for included offense after reversal of conviction.
Where there was insufficient evidence to
support defendant's conviction for second degree murder, but there was sufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the included offense
of manslaughter, Supreme Court, pursuant to
this section, vacated and set aside the conviction of second degree murder on appeal and
entered a judgment of conviction for the included offense of manslaughter. State v.
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
Evidence of depraved indifference to the risk
of death was insufficient to support defendant's
conviction of second degree murder, but there
was sufficient evidence of recklessness to support a conviction of the included offense of
manslaughter; the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Subsection (5), remanded the case to the trial
and to enter a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214
(Utah 1985).

"Act."
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not
only volitional acts of a defendant, but also the
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a

Jurisdiction of a single court.
Plea of guilty to two charges in justice of the
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41-2-122

MOTOR VEHICLES
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 96 et seq.

C.J.S. — 60 C J.S. Motor Vehicles § 146.
Key Numbers. — Automobiles <&=> 136.

41-2-122. Change of address — Duty of licensee to notify
division within ten days — Method of giving notice by division.
(1) When a person, after applying for or receiving a license, moves from the
address named in the application or in the license certificate issued to him,
the person shall within ten days notify the division in writing of his new
address and of the number of any license held by him.
(2) (a) When the division is authorized or required to give any notice under
this chapter or other law regulating the operation of vehicles, unless a
different method of giving notice is otherwise prescribed, the notice shall
be given either by personal delivery to the person to be notified or by
deposit in the United States mail of the notice in an envelope with postage prepaid, addressed to the person at his address as shown by the
records of the division. The giving of notice by mail is complete upon the
expiration of four days after the deposit of the notice.
(b) Proof of the giving of notice in either manner may be made by the
certificate of any officer or employee of the division or affidavit of any
person older than 18 years of age, naming the person to whom the notice
was given and specifying the time, place, and manner of the giving of it.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-13.1, enacted by L.
1967, ch. 82, § 10; 1983, ch. 183, § 17; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment renumbered this section which formerly

appeared as § 41-2-13.1, designated the former
section as Subsection (1), substituted "division"
for "department" and made changes m phraseology in Subsection (1), and added Subsection
(2).

41-2-123. Duplicate license certificate — Fee.
(1) If a license certificate issued under the provisions of this chapter is lost,
stolen, or destroyed, the person to whom it was issued may obtain a duplicate
upon furnishing proof satisfactory to the division that the license certificate
has been lost, stolen, or destroyed and upon payment of a fee under Section
41-2-103.
(2) When the division is advised that a license certificate has been lost,
stolen, or destroyed, it is then void.
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, § 14; 1935, ch. 47,
§ 2; 1941, ch. 51, § 2; C. 1943, 54-7-17; L.
1951, ch. 64, § 1; 1967, ch. 82, § 8; 1982, ch.
44, § 6; 1983, ch. 183, § 18; C. 1953, 41-2-14;
renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-

ment renumbered this section which formerly
appeared as § 41-2-14, designated the first
sentence as Subsection (1) and the second sentence as Subsection (2), substituted "division"
for "department" throughout the section, and
made minor changes in phraseology and style
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MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-407, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Subsection (2) designation; redesignated former
Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3), added
Subsections (l)ia), (1Mb), and 14); deleted "and
will continue to have the ability to pay judg-

41-12a-412

ments in an amount equal to twice the single
limit amount under Subsection 31 A-22-304(2)M
following "has" in Subsection (1); substituted
"chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2);
and substituted "In accordance with Chapter
46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act"
for "l3pon not less than five days' notice and a
hearing pursuant to notice" in Subsection (3).

41-12a-412. Proof of owner's or operator's security required to preserve registration.
(1) A motor vehicle may not be registered in the name of any person required to file proof of owner's security unless proof of that security is furnished for the motor vehicle.
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (b), if the department lawfully suspends or
revokes the driver's license of any person upon receiving record of a conviction or a forfeiture of bail from a court of record, the department shall
also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles registered in the name
of the person.
(b) Unless otherwise required by law, the department may not suspend
the person's motor vehicle registration under Subsection (a), if the person
has given or immediately gives and then maintains proof of owner's security for all motor vehicles registered by the person.
(3) Licenses and registrations suspended or revoked under this section may
not be renewed, nor may any driver's license thereafter be issued, nor may
any motor vehicle be thereafter registered in the name of the person until he
gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's security.
(4) If a person is not licensed, but by final order or judgment is convicted of
or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to secure an appearance for trial for
any offense requiring the suspension or revocation of license, or for operating
an unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways, a license may not thereafter be issued to the person and a motor vehicle may not continue or be registered in his name until he gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's
security.
(5) If the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's operating privilege because of a conviction or forfeiture of bail, the privilege remains suspended or revoked unless the person has given or immediately gives and
thereafter maintains proof of owner's security.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-412, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1992, ch. 80, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added the subsection designations (2)(a) and (2Kb), added
"Subject to Subsection (b)" at the beginning of
Subsection (2)(a) and inserted "from a court of

record" near the middle of that subsection, substituted all of the present language of Subsection (2)(b) before "if the person" for "The department may not suspend the person's motor
vehicle registration unless otherwise required
by law," and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
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Rule 4

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Service on attorney.
Notice served upon a party's attorney of

record is sufficient. State v WagstafT, 772 P.2d
987 (Utah Ct. App 1989).

Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses.
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense
has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten
days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may,
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal
meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate
the indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall
335
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not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural
person
Cross-References. — Accused entitled to
copy of accusation, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 12
Circuit courts, criminal jurisdiction,
§ 78-4-5
Jurisdiction of military court, § 39-6-16
Criminal Code definition of "corporation,"
§ 76-2-201
Criminal Code not strictly construed,
§ 76-1 106
Criminal responsibility of corporation,
§ 76-2-204
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct
in name of corporation, § 76-2-205
Double jeopardy, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 12,
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405, 77-1-6
General definitions for Criminal Code,
§ 76-1-601

"Indictment" defined, § 77-1-3
"Information" defined, § 77-1-3
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201
Justice
courts, criminal jurisdiction
§ 78-5-104 et seq
Juveniles, jurisdiction, transfer, §§ 78 3a-16
to 78-3a-19
Nonmatenal errors and mistakes, Rule 30
Preliminary examination, Rule 7
Proof of corporate existence, § 77-17-5
Prosecution by indictment or information af
ter examination and commitment or waiver
thereof, Utah Const, Art I, Sec 13
Removal of officers, Utah Const, Art VI,
Sec 21, § 77-6-1 et seq
Statutory construction and definitions m
general, §§ 68-3-11, 68-3-12

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Bills of particulars
—In general
—Contents
—Discretion of court
—Effect on evidence at trial
—Failure to provide
—Failure to request
—Following amendment of information
—Not required
—Purpose
—Substantially provided
Indictments and informations
—Amendments
—Choice
—Contents
Errors
Specific offenses
Time and place of offense
Victim

—Endorsement on information
—Included offenses
—Necessity
—Objections
Waiver
—Procedure upon information
—Sufficiency
—Use of disjunctive
Cited

Bills of particulars.
—In general.
If an accused is in doubt as to the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the al
leged fact or facts the state proposes to prove
might be secured by demanding a bill of particulars State v Robbms, 102 Utah 119,127 P 2d
1042 (1942)
Where defendant in manslaughter prosecu
tion was charged with only one unlawful act, a
battery, allegation in bill of particulars that
battery occurred when defendant engaged in
mutual combat with deceased was mere sur
plusage and did not state separate unlawful
act State v Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P2d
738 (1947)
—Contents.
There is no requirement that defendant be
told in a bill of particulars what evidence will
be presented to prove the charge against him
State v Moraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P 2d 831
(1970)
A bill of particulars need not plead matters
of evidence that the prosecution plans to use at
trial State v Mitchell, 571 P 2d 1351 (Utah
1977)
—Discretion of court.
Granting of bill of particulars was not discre
tionary with court, but under statute was a
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Qary O. McKean

110 north 100 West

County Attorney

Logan, Utah 84321

James C. Jenkins
Deputy

(801) 752-8920

Jeffrey "R" Burbank
Deputy

Patrick B. riolan
Deputy

September 01, 1992

Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

State v. Dunbar
Case No. 920341-CA

Dear Clerk:
We just realized that, in our Brief of Appellee in the aboveentitled case, which we mailed to you on Friday, August 28, 1992,
we inadvertently left out copies of the Criminal Summons and
Information (pp. 184-186 of the Record) from the Addendum to the
Brief.
Enclosed are eight (8) copies each of the Criminal Summons and
Information. Please add them to the documents already included in
the Addendum to the Brief.
We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this oversight,
and thank you for your assistance.
Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK B. NOLAN
Deputy Cache County Attorney
Enclosures
cc:

Ted Perry (w/enclosures)

PBN:cat

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OfTUTAH ~" ' V j £ D
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
. i-^L..

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

,1

I H *»'

INFORMATION

No.^(| ^ COL/S

/J—

DON W. DUNBAR,
DOB: 12-18-53
Defendant.
The undersigned Jim Mecham, under oath states on information and
belief that the above named defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Driving During Suspension
Section 41-2-136 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
Class C Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
May 17, 1991

The acts of the defendant(s) constituting the crime(s) were:
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did
wilfully and unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon the
highways of this State after his Driver's License had been
suspended.
The information is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: Jim Mecham

Authorized for presentment
and filing by the Cache
County Attorney:
BY

05-31-91

Subscribed a/hd sworn to before
me this 3> \ _ day of

^•K_

Summons Issued.

en
13 o ;
CD

oo

REVIVED
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAHJ ° "I ' '
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
^y
^

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

-

i * IIn.

S U M M O N S

DON W. DUNBAR,
Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT(S) :
Complaint under oath by Jim Mecham has been made that you
committed the crime of:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF;
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Driving During Suspension
Section 41-2-136 U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
Class C Misdemeanor
Cache County, State of Utah
May 17, 1991

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to appear before a judge of the
Circuit Court at 140 North 1st West, Logan, Utah 9:00 a.m. on the
first Tuesday following the service of this summons upon you to
answer the charge made against you. If you fail to obey this
summons, the court may issue a warrant for your Arrest.

Dated x^hlc *

RETURN OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH

)
J 11 i j (

County of Cache )
I hereby make return of service, and certify:
1.

I am a duly qualified and acting peace oc;:cei; ;:r am ^
person over the age of 21 years, and am :* ~.~ a party to
this action.
I received this Summons on the date of
,
and served it upon the defendant(s) listed below by
leaving, at the address(es) and on the date(s) shown
below, a copy with the defendant or with a person of
suitable age and discretion at the usual place of abode
of the defendant, to whom T ,?I<*O showed the original.

3.

Upon service the same, I endorsed the date and place of
service and my name on the copy served.

Defendant's name and address

Date served:

Don W. Dunbar
DOB. i 12-18-53

Si

y

/^/' 5V t %s<& l

S^\

(State whether defendant was served
personally; if not, include name of
person with whom copy was left.)

p—^^t*?'

DATED:
{Official Tltfle)

tP

^

V;

%

' / ,

